Data breaches are not only on the increase but firms struggle to detect, defend and respond to such breaches. A data breach opens a period of crisis for the affected firm, generates complex information, and requires providing information to a variety of stakeholders in a timely and proper manner. This article reports one of the first studies on the impact of social media exposure by affected firms on stock price reaction to a data breach announcement. Using an event study methodology on a sample of 87 data breaches from 73 US publicly-traded firms from 2011 to 2014, we find that use of social media exposure at the time of a data breach exacerbates the negative stock price to the announcement. Interestingly, we find that this negative association is contingent on traditional media visibility; the effect is positive for low-visibility companies. Based on our results, we posit that there is a need for a contingency model for social media communication during firm crises and such a model should be based at least on firm size, visibility and the type of crisis.
Introduction
In the current business environment, firms rely heavily on information systems and data analytics to build their competitive advantage (LaValle, Lesser, Shockley, Hopkins, and Kruschwitz 2011; Chen, Chiang, and Storey 2012) . The amount of data organizations collect, store and process has grown exponentially in the last few years (LaValle et al. 2011; Liu and Ye 2016) . This data usually contains valuable and sensitive information about customers, business partners, and about the organization itself. Therefore, a data loss or the involuntary disclosure of such information may generate significant damage for the affected organization. Given the rapid growth of the number the data breaches over the last few years (Ponemon Institute 2018), cyber security for firms has become a real concern for managers, investors and regulators (Ponemon Institute 2016; Verizon 2017) .
In this paper, we investigate the effect of social media exposure by affected firms on stock price reaction to a data breach announcement in order to understand whether such an alternative communication channel mitigates or exacerbates the cost of a data breach.
A data breach is defined as an incident that involves unauthorized access to sensitive, protected, or confidential data 1 resulting in the compromise or potential compromise of either confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information asset (Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou 2011) . The number of information systems breaches is growing every year and the increasing popularity of cloud computing, mobile devices and big data exacerbate this issue (Romanosky, Hoffman, and Acquisti 2014; Abbasi, Saker abd Chiang 2016) . As such, firms are investing more and more in ways to protect their information systems from cyber-attacks (Srinidhi, Yan, and Tayi 2015) . According to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 543 million records were lost between January 2005
and January 2012 as a consequence of 2,800 data breaches (Risius and Beck 2015) .
Data breaches impose significant costs on the affected companies both in the short and long term. Short-term costs are due to investigation and remediation activities, legal advisory, fines, and lost transactions (Aral, Dellarocas, and Godes 2013) . A prominent example of the short-term cost of a data breach is ChoicePoint. In early 2006, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) imposed a $10 million fine against ChoicePoint as a consequence of a massive data breach that involved 160,000 records; the company also agreed to pay another $5 million to compensate affected individuals (Federal Trade Commission -FTC 2009 ). Long-term costs are related to loss of present and future revenues as well as the deterioration of customers' and partners' trust (Charette, Adams, and White 1997; Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan 2004; Aral et al. 2013; Dennis, Wixom, and Tegarden 2015) . These long-term costs usually represent most of the overall cost of a data breach (Goel and Shawky 2009; Gatzlaff and McCullough 2010) .
However, they are extremely hard to quantify. For this reason, empirical researchers adopt stock price reaction (i.e. stock return) as a proxy (Goel and Shawky 2009; Gatzlaff and McCullough 2010) and have shown that a breach may cause a loss in firm value of up to 5.5 percent (Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou 2003) .
Given its unexpected nature and the potential harm that a data breach may generate, it clearly fits the definition of a company crisis proposed by Schultz, Utz, and Göritz (2011) 2 . In this context, timely communication can limit potential harm (Lee, Hutton, and Shu 2015) and this is one of main concerns for regulators in the case of a data breach. However, investigating a data breach is complex and may require a significant amount of time and deep technical capabilities (Casey 2006) . As a result, details about the incident may not become apparent or public for some time resulting in uncertainty 2 According to Schultz et al. (2011) . a firm's crisis can be defined as 'a specific, unexpected and non-routine event or series of events that create high levels of uncertainty and threaten, or are perceived to threaten, an organization's high priority goals '. which may adversely affect the market reaction (Kalev, Liu, Pham, and Jarnecic 2004) .
during this period. Similarly, the explanation surrounding the data breach announcement may be complex therefore how this information is communicated is particularly important (Coombs 2007; Utz, Schultz, and Glocka 2013) .
Firms have usually relied on traditional media (i.e. the press) to disseminate information (Blankerspoon, Miller, and White 2014) . However, traditional media may not always be the most useful communication channel in the context of a crisis as it tends to focus on highly visible firms since they attract larger readership (Miller 2006; Barber and Odean 2008) . As a result, low visibility firms, which represent the largest part of the market, struggle in reaching their stakeholders through traditional media, and this may be particularly detrimental in the context of company crisis. The emergence of social media has signaled a step change in recent years offering firms an alternative communication channel through which they can disseminate information more effectively, to a wider audience, and at a relatively low cost.
Social media is a set of internet-based tools and applications that allow users to create (consume) content that can be consumed (created) by others and which enables and facilitates connections (Hoffman and Novak 2012) . Social media is now widely adopted by firms for corporate communication and has been recognized as an official communication channel (Securities and Exchange Commission -SEC 2013) . Studies suggest that (i) social media represents nowadays the main source of information for an increasing number of people (Jansen, Zhang, Sobel, and Chowdury 2009; Coombs 2014 ), (ii) that information disseminated through such a communication channel has impact on stock returns and information asymmetry (Blankerspoon et al. 2014; Jung, Naughton, Tahoun, and Wang 2015) , and (iii) that it is an effective communication channel during company crises (Lee et al. 2015; Jahng and Hong 2017) .
Among different social media platforms, many studies focus on Twitter since it is the most commonly adopted for social investor communication and company event disclosure (Blankerspoon et al. 2014; Jung et al. 2015) . Furthermore, Twitter has the peculiarity of being a largely open network and it also has the unique feature of 'retweeting', which makes it a powerful mechanism for information sharing (Kietzmann, Hermkens, McCarthy and Silvestre 2011; Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan 2013) .
In this study, we specifically focus on Twitter since anecdotal evidence reveals that firms try to exploit its characteristics to disseminate information about data breaches. (Lee et al. 2015) , potentially lowering the cost of the breach (Ponemon Institute 2016) and exposure to litigation risk (Swanson, Kirsch, and Dunigan 2013) . Despite these advantages, some studies advise caution in how the value of social media is measured since social media per se cannot generate value without the implementation of an adequate communication strategy and without the allocation of adequate resources (Culnan, McHugh and Zubillaga 2010; Jung et al. 2015) . In fact, social media generates an expectation of instant feedback to the public and meeting such expectation may be challenging during a crisis when the number of requests can be overwhelming (Stephens and Malone 2009; Jahng and Hong 2017) . Furthermore, due to the virality typical of social media and to the potential high number of information requests, a company may lose control of the information flow, thereby in fact worsening an already serious situation (Blankerspoon et al. 2014; Jung et al. 2015; Lee et al. 2015; Jahng and Hong 2017) . Therefore, by increasing corporate organization's exposure to the public (Conway and Ward 2007) , social media may also increase the risk of a potential crisis escalation (Siah Ann Mei, Bansal and Pang 2010). Ultimately, understanding the effect of social media usage around data breaches is critical to providing guidance to firms that suffer data breaches and this study aims to shed light on its potential contrasting impacts.
Our study contributes to the literature on data breaches in two pivotal ways. Firstly, to our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the impact of communication and disclosure via social media on market reaction to data breach announcements. Previous studies have focused on breach characteristics and firm characteristics. We therefore provide novel and important insights for management into communications strategy around data breaches. Secondly, our study contributes to the ongoing debate on the economic impact of data breach announcements by providing new evidence of a negative price reaction to news of a data breach. Our study also contributes to the literature on the impact of social media for crisis communication by investigating the role of social media in the context of data breach disclosure, and by providing unique evidence of a significant benefit to social media for low visibility firms in particular, which typically struggle in gaining attention in traditional media.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical development and the research hypotheses. The following section describes the research design and the data collection. We then present the results of the empirical analyses and the robustness tests, and conclude by discussing the implications of the study and directions for future research.
Hypotheses Development
Disseminating information around a breach event quickly is a requirement under compliance with the Security Breach Notification Laws (SBNLs), which have been enacted in the US since 2003 3 . Academic literature on crisis communication clearly suggests that it is even more important to spread the information to a large audience in order to limit the potential harm and repair any associated reputation damage; to this aim, the use of social media may be particularly beneficial (Seeger 2006) . Furthemore, social media allows firms to provide timely updates about the investigation and remediation of the data breach therefore reducing uncertainty and communicating the firm's competence in handling the crisis, hence lessening stakeholders' negative beliefs (Lee et al. 2015) .
However, the adoption of social media in the context of a data breach may also have a detrimental effect which may ultimately worsen the stock price reaction. As mentioned above, a company crisis like a data breach is likely generate large volumes of interactions with the public. In this context, keeping control over the information flow may be challenging and at the same time paramount (Lee et al. 2015; Jahng and Hong 2017) . If such control is not maintained, the reputation damage may be more pronounced due to the spreading of misinformation around the breach event.
The conflicting arguments outlined so far match with the conclusions of Aral et al. (2013, p. 9) , who state that "there is, currently, little understanding with respect to the best ways in which companies should organize and manage social media." In the light of the above, and being the first study investigating the effect of social media usage in the context of data breach disclosure, we are not able to predict what would be the impact of social media and so state our first research hypothesis in null form.
H1:
Social media exposure has no impact on the negative stock price reaction to data breach announcements.
With the first hypothesis establishing whether a relationship exists between general social media exposure and the stock market reaction to data breach announcements, more nuanced effects must next be considered. It is noted that traditional media accommodates high visibility firms, while low visibility firms struggle in reaching a large audience with their company specific news (Miller 2006; Barber and Odean 2008) . This may be particularly detrimental when information has to be disclosed quickly, as in the case for data breach events. The risk is that low visibility firms, though they detect the breach quickly, cannot disseminate the event information effectively because they do not command enough attention in traditional media and, therefore, face larger relative damage. Social media levels the playing field somewhat by providing low visibility firms direct access to a potentially wider audience and a greater prospect of market attention than would otherwise be possible (Lee et al. 2015 ).
As such, it provides the affected firm with an opportunity to disclose data breach event information in a more effective manner. Given this important innovation provided by social media, we test whether there is a difference in market reaction between high and low visibility firms. Our contention is that, in contrast to high visibility firms, low visibility firms benefit from having the level of market attention afforded by its social media presence, over and above the case of either no traditional media or very limited traditional media news coverage. For high visibility firms, a social media presence simply adds to an already established level of market attention. We therefore state our second hypothesis as follows.
H2:
Social media exposure decreases the negative stock price reaction to data breach announcements for low visibility firms.
While we have thus far focused on general social media communication, we consider next the specific case where social media is used as the outlet to disclose a breach event.
Although the disclosure of a data breach is mandatory, under security breach notification laws, the communication of the event on social media is voluntary. Prior studies show that firms are likely to use voluntary disclosure to share positive news while they are more reluctant to voluntarily disclose bad news (Mayew 2008; Larcker, Larcker, and Tayan 2012) . Jung et al. (2015) provide evidence of such a tendency in using social media. Since a data breach is bad news, and with this bad news being broadcast to a wide audience using social media, we expect the negative price reaction to the announcement to be larger if a firm discloses the event through its social media account. Our third hypothesis is therefore stated as follows.
H3:
Firm of social media to disclose a data breach increases the negative stock price reaction.
Data and Research Methodology
In this study, we adopt an event study methodology (MacKinlay 1997) to investigate whether and how social media exposure affects the stock price reaction to a data breach announcement. The event study methodology is based on the efficient market theory which states that new information in the market will fully reflect in a firm's stock price.
Because the market should not be capable of anticipating when firms will make a data breach announcement, it is appropriate to use the event methodology to catch unexpected business events in the stock market (Chai, Kim, and Rao 2011) .
Multivariate Regression Models
The following regression model is used to test H1 and H2:
The dependent variable in Equation (1) is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over a two-day period starting on the announcement day (0; +1) (hereafter, the event period) (Cavusoglu et al. 2004; Gatzlaff and McCullough 2010) . We adopt the market model (Fama et al. 1969 ) to estimate daily abnormal returns (ARs) and then sum up the daily ARs over the event period to obtain the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), which is proxy for price reaction to the announcement (Campbell et al. 2003; Cavusoglu et al. 2004; Gatzlaff and McCullough 2010) . The market model equation is shown in Equation (2).
where R i,t is the stock return for firm i on day t; RF t is the risk-free interest rate on day t; RM t is the stock return of market on day t; α i is Jensen's alpha for firm i,; β i is the CAPM slope parameter for firm i (i.e., the systematic risk of the return of firm i, relative to the return of the entire market, and often denoted as the beta of the stock); and ε it is the model's error term.
To capture the effect of social media exposure on price reaction, we adopt two indicator variables (i.e. Twitter and Low_TMV) and the interaction variable between them (Twitter x Low_TMV). Twitter is equal to 1 when a company had an active Twitter account (Java, Song, Finin, and Tseg 2007) when the breach occurred, and 0 otherwise.
Low_TMV identifies firms with low visibility on traditional media; as such it is equal to 1 if the average daily number of newspaper articles during the estimation period was below the first tercile threshold, and 0 otherwise. The interaction variable (Twitter x Low_TMV) allows us to explore if there is a difference between high and low visibility firms. The regression coefficient of Twitter tests H1, while the regression coefficient of the interaction variable tests H2.
A second regression model is used to test whether the use of social media to disclose breach events decreases the negative stock price reaction to data breach announcements (H3). This model is specified as follows: 
The dependent variable is still the CARs over the event window, but the variables of interest are different. In order to capture the effect of a data breach announcement trough social media, we create an indicator variable (TweetEvent) that denotes whether a firm announced the breach on its Twitter account or not. The interaction variable
TweetEvent x Low_TMV reveals if the announcement of a breach through a firm's
Twitter account generates a differential effect for low visibility companies. The coefficient on this interaction term will provide some complementary insights into H3.
Our models also include four categories of control variables: (a) controls for breach characteristics; (b) controls for traditional media activity; (c) controls for social media activity 4 ; and (d) controls for firm characteristics.
We begin with defining the first group of controls. The cost of a data breach, and, therefore, the market reaction to the announcement, depends on the breach type (Campbell et al. 2003; Cavusoglu et al. 2004; Gatzlaff and McCulloug 2010) . In this paper, we adopt the classification proposed by the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 5 . We adopt six different indicator variables to identify breaches due to (a) a payment card fraud (Card), (b) an unintended information disclosure (Disc), (c) an attack by a hacker (Hack), (d) an insider misbehavior (Insd), (e) a lost, discarded or stolen portable device (Port), and (f) an unknown reason (Unkn) 6 . In order to avoid collinearity issues, we do not include Unkn in the regression model and keep it as baseline. Stock price reaction may also be affected by the number of records breached (Campbell et al. 2003; Cavusoglu et al. 2004; Gatzlaff and McCulloug 2010) . However, this information is not always provided at the moment of the announcement. This may be due to the absence of breached records or, more likely, to ongoing investigation; this creates more uncertainty around the overall cost of the breach. We adopt an indicator variable (RecordsKnown) that indicates whether a firm disclosed the exact number of breached records when it disclosed the event. We also control for the presence of prior breaches 7 by adding the indicator variable PriorBreach since investors might penalize more those firms affected by multiple incidents (Gatzlaff and McCulloug 2010) .
Following Lee et al. (2015) , we include also a control variable for traditional media and social media activity in our model. AbnTradMedia is constructed as presented in Equation (4), where TradMedia is the average daily number of newspaper articles during the event period (0,+1) while NTradMedia is the average daily number of newspaper articles during a 120-day estimation period ending five days before the event (-125,-6) 8 . This variable provides a measure of the abnormal attention a firm attracts around a data breach announcement.
Control variables for social media activity include (a) AbnTweet which measures the abnormal Twitter activity of the firm during the event period, and (b) the natural logarithm of the number of followers of the firm's account on the announcement day (Followers) which provides a measure of the size of the potential audience. Equation (5) shows how we construct AbnTweet. In particular, Tweet (NTweet) is the average daily number of tweets generated by the Twitter account of firm i during the event period
(estimation period) of event j.
We also include control variables for firm characteristics like (a) the size of the affected company measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (Size) (Cavusoglu et al. 2004; Gatzlaff and McCullough 2010) ; (b) its growth opportunities proxied by the market-tobook ratio (Growth) (Gatzlaff and McCullough 2010) ; and (c) whether it operates in an industry with high expectations 9 in terms of cyber security (HighExp) (Gatzlaff and McCullough 2010) .
Finally, following Lee et al. (2015) , we include the interaction variables between Size and the other control variables in the model presented in Equation (1) for model specification purposes. Table 1 reports a definition and data source for each variable included in our models.
Insert Table 1 here
Sample and Data
We build our sample starting from the list of breaches that occurred from January 2011
to December 2014 as compiled by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 10 . While the number of Twitter users has increased since 2010 (Lee et al. 2015) , the actual number of tweets, which denotes the real activity, only increased dramatically in 2011 11 . For this reason, we adopt 2011 as the starting year of our sample.
The initial event list included 2,257 breaches. Being interested in analyzing the stock price reaction to the announcement, we deleted all events that affected non-publicly traded companies (2,034). We then searched on Lexis-Nexis and Twitter 12 to determine if any information leakage occurred for any of the breaches in our sample within seven days before the official announcement date and, if this was the case, we adjusted the event date to the date of this first newspaper article or tweet. This occurred for 14 events. We also used Lexis-Nexis to check whether any confounding event 13 occurred in a seven-day period before the announcement of a given breach. 57 events were excluded on this basis. In case of multiple events for the same firm, we required the events to be at least 130 days apart from each other. This was necessary to avoid that the event period of an incident falls within the estimation period of a following breach affecting the same firm therefore introducing a bias in the latter. We excluded 47 events that did not meet this condition. In order to ensure a sample of comparable events, we excluded 9 events that were announced during weekends or public holidays. Finally, we excluded 23 events because of missing values. Our final sample therefore consists of 87 events corresponding to 73 individual firms 14 .
We searched for the main Twitter accounts or for customer services Twitter accounts on the firms' websites and then used Twitter advanced search to check whether the firms tweeted about the data breach 15 . When a firm had both active main and customer service
Twitter accounts, we considered only the customer service accounts as this would more likely be targeted by customers' complaints (Li, Berens, and De Maertelaere 2013) .
Finally, given that Security Breach Notification Laws were enacted in different years across different states, we checked that all firms in our final sample were subject to mandatory disclosure when the breach occurred. TwitterCounter statistics include the daily number of tweets generated from a specific account as well as the daily number of followers and followings.
Insert Table 2 here   Insert Table 3 here
Insert Table 4 here 14 The limited sample size reflects the data availability and the need to apply adequate filters in order to reduce possible noise. Both the sampling criteria and the size of our sample are in line with previous studies on the same topic (Cavusoglu et al. 2004; Gatzlaff and McCulloug 2010; Gordon et al. 2011) . 15 We searched whether any tweet was generated from the official Twitter account containing the following keywords in the event period 'breach OR breached OR breaches OR hacker OR hacked OR attack'. All the tweets retrieved were manually inspected to ensure that they were related to the announcement of the data breach that affected the company that generated the message. 16 Following Lee et al. (2015) , we searched for company name or ticker symbol in the headlines or the lead paragraph of newspaper articles. 17 http://twittercounter.com/. Although the focus of this study is on the most immediate impact of the announcement over the days (0,+1), looking at different time windows is useful to understand how long the effect of the announcement lasts and whether there is a price under-/overreaction to the announcement. Panel A in Table 5 shows that a data breach has a negative impact over a three-day period starting at the announcement day (0,+2), but the largest price drop occurs over the first two days (0,+1) when breached firms lose on average 1.6 percent of their market value. Results show also that the stock price recovers three days after the announcement, which indicates that a breach causes only a short-term negative effect on stock price. To check for price under-or over-reaction, we also estimated CARs over a seven-day period starting four days after the announcement (from day +4 to day +10). If there was under-(over-)reaction, the stock price would fall Insert Table 5 here Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables included in our regression models. We winsorized all continuous variables at 1 and 99 percent to avoid any outlier that could alter the results. Panel A shows that, as reported above, the average price change (CARs) is 1.6 percent. 25 percent of the events in our sample caused a price drop larger than 2.6 percent while another 25 percent caused a moderate increase. The average value of AbnTradMedia reveals that traditional media pays a lot of attention to data breaches since the number of newspaper articles concerning the events in our sample increases, on average, by 32 percent over the event period. Looking at social media activity, results show that breached firms increase their Twitter activity, on average, by 10 percent, and that only 9 percent of firms with an active Twitter account decide to disclose the event through their account suggesting opportunistic behavior in social media communication (Jung et al. 2015) . Finally, the number of records breached is disclosed for just 35 percent of the events in our sample, while almost 40 percent of the events are preceded by other breaches.
Results and Discussion

Univariate Analysis
Panel B in Table 6 compares the average values between the two subsamples of firms, those with and without an active Twitter account. Results show that there is a statistically-significant difference only regarding the percentage of low-visibility firms in the two subsamples. Indeed, they represent around 19 (49) percent of observations in the Twitter (Non-Twitter) subsample. This evidence might signal that low-visibility firms did not value the potential benefit of social media communication.
Insert Table 6 here
We also performed a correlation analysis among all the variables included in our regression models. The results (not tabulated) confirm the existence of a positive relationship between company size and traditional media coverage, and show evidence of no strong correlations between different explanatory variables therefore suggesting that multicollinearity should not affect the results of our regression model (Gujarati and Porter 2003) .
Effect of Social Media Exposure on Stock Price
In order to test the research hypotheses H1-H3, we adopt a pooled ordinary leastsquares (OLS) regression with time fixed effects.
Panel A in Table 7 presents OLS coefficients and levels of significance for each the variables of the models presented in Equation (1). This regression involves all 87 events in our sample and the variables of interest are Twitter and Twitter x Low_TMV since they test H1 and H2 respectively.
The results show that the potential negative effects of social media communication outweigh its potential benefits in the context of data breach announcements. The coefficient of Twitter is negative and statistically significant. This indicates that a firm's social media exposure worsens the stock price reaction, on average, by 1.2 percent following a data breach announcement. This leads us to reject H1. This result is the opposite of the one obtained by Lee et al. (2015) , who show that the use of interactive social media (i.e. Twitter and Facebook) lowers the negative market reaction to product recall announcements, and provides evidence that different crises need different communication strategies (Utz et al. 2013) . The complexity of security breach notifications laws and the greater uncertainty around costs are likely factors for the difference in results.
In contrast to the above, social media exposure for low visibility firms mitigates the negative effect of the breach, on average, by 3.5 percent (see coefficient of Twitter x Low_TMV). This result confirms that social media provides low-visibility firms with the opportunity to engage in a more effective communication and supports H2.
Insert Table 7 here followers), the more negative the price response to announcement, as evidenced by the negative coefficient of Followers. In particular, the result indicates that stock prices decrease, on average, by 0.53 percent for every 100 followers.
Insert Table 8 here
Robustness Test
The dependent variable of both regression models employed in this study is the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). As shown above, we estimate CARs based on the Market Model (Fama et al. 1969 ). Fama and French (1993) propose an alternative model to estimate CARs. Their model, known as the Three-factor Model, includes two factors other than the market index return which are the difference of returns between (a) firms with small and large market capitalization and (b) firms with high and low book-to-market ratio. The Three-factor Model equation is shown in Equation (6).
where R i,t is the stock return for firm i on day t; RF t is the risk-free rate on day t; RM t is the return of the market on day t; SMB t is the difference between the returns on a portfolio of small and large stocks on day t; HML t is the difference between the return on a portfolio of high and low book-to-market stocks on day t; α i , β i , δ i and γ i are the model intercept and sensitivity parameters, respectively, for firm i; and ε i,t is the model's error term.
In order to ensure that the results of our analysis do not depend on the estimation model adopted, we estimate CARs using the Three-factor Model and run the regressions using the new CARs as dependent variable. The results (not tabulated) are consistent with ones discussed above, therefore we can conclude that the results of this study are robust to the CAR estimation model specification.
Finally, to ensure that our findings on low visibility firms are not driven by the threshold adopted, we repeat the analysis adopting a quartile-based classification. In this case, low visibility firms are the ones with an average daily number of newspaper articles during the estimation period below the first quartile threshold. The results (not tabulated) are consistent also in this case, therefore we can conclude that the results of this study are robust to different visibility classification criteria.
Conclusion
This paper investigates whether the use of social media affects the price reaction to a data breach announcement. Our empirical analysis suggests that communication via social media (i.e. Twitter) tends to exacerbate the negative impact of data breach announcements on stock price, causing an average additional decrease of 1.2 percent over a two-day event period (0,+1),. Further analyses suggest that the negative effect of social media is even more pronounced when firms (a) disclose the event through their
Twitter account (-5.2 percent), (b) increase the communication via social media (i.e.
number of tweets) in the event period, and (c) have a larger audience on social media (i.e. followers). However, our results also suggest that the impact of social media is positive for low-visibility firms.
The contribution of this study is threefold. Firstly, the study provides new insights into the cost of data breaches by adding communication via social media as a new significant factor affecting the price reaction to a data breach announcement. In so doing we provide additional evidence on the effectiveness of the use of social media for crisis communication, but we also contribute to the ongoing debate on the net effect that social media generates in crisis communication by providing evidence of a differential impact based on firms' visibility on traditional media. Our study provides evidence and important practical information for firms making communication decisions in crises such as these. Although there is a generalized positive view on the adoption of social media in firms' communications, managers should also be aware of the challenges that it generates, and of the peculiarity of the crisis they are dealing.
Secondly, our paper provides further evidence of a negative price reaction to data breach announcements contributing to the debate about the economic impact of data breaches and showing additional potential outcomes related to the way the information is delivered to the stakeholders.
Thirdly, our study contributes to the research on the impact of company disclosure through social media on stock market by confirming that it significantly affects the stock price and providing evidence of a positive impact on low visibility firms in regard of data breach announcements. By showing that social media usage is likely to either help or hinder a firm in the context of a crisis, these results are likely to be useful for industry as they highlight the need for a contingent crisis communication strategy based on firm visibility and on the type of crisis a firm is facing.
This study is also subject to some limitations. Firstly, our analysis considers only Lexis-Nexis Size Natural logarithm of firm's total assets at the end of the fiscal year before the event.
DataStream Professional
Growth
The ratio between the book and the market value of firm's equity at the end of the fiscal year before the event.
DataStream Professional HighExp This panel provides the mean values of the main variables included in the regression analysis for the Twitter and No-Twitter subsamples. P-values denote the level of significance of the t-Tests under the null hypothesis of equal means in the two subsamples. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. All the variables are presented in Table 1 . This table provides OLS coefficients, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, t-statistics and p-values for the variables included in the regression model presented in Equation (1). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. All the variables are presented in Table 1 . This table provides OLS coefficients, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, t-statistics and p-values for the variables included in the regression model presented in Equation (2). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. All the variables are presented in Table 1 .
